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ABSTRACT
Currently the Caspian is simple described as the world's biggest enclosed
body of salt water. The five littoral states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia,
Turkmenistan and Iran, have not come to an agreement in regards to the legal status
of the Caspian, which means it is not considered to be a lake or a sea. This incident
can be explained by the legal consequences of claiming the Caspian as an
International Lake or Sea. As one could assume, this two statuses greatly differ in
regards to their legal structures.
It is of the utmost importance to not that the various national interests of the
littoral states prevent them from reaching a concrete compromise on this issue. Yet
a third legal definition with the potential of ending the dispute over the Caspian has
for many years overlooked. The name of this official status if called the
Condominium and it supports the common usage of the Caspian Sea by all littoral
states. Unfortunately no littoral state has shown any sympathy for this proposal.
Perhaps then it is clear that none of these legal regimes are capable of producing an
adequate solution to this conflict unless the problem is observed from
unconventional means.
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Chapter One
An Introduction to the Caspian Legal Dispute
Introduction
The Caspian Sea, as it is referred to by the international community of
nation-states, is neither an official lake nor sea. As it currently stands, the Caspian
is simply described as the world's biggest body of enclosed salt water. For better or
worse, the five littoral states, which includes the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Republic of Azerbaijan, the Federated States of Russia, the Republic of
Turkmenistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, have not come to an agreement on
the legal status of possession in regards to the Caspian. Such an incident can be
explained by the legal implications of claiming the Caspian as an international Lake
or Sea, which greatly differ. Therefore, the various national interests of the littoral
states prevent them from reaching a concrete compromise on the latter issue.
However, a third legal definition with the potential of ending the dispute over the
Caspian has been discovered. It is called condominium and it is based off of the
principle of common usage of the Caspian Sea by all littoral states along with the
equal distribution of its valuable resources. Obviously no littoral state has shown
any sympathy for this proposal (Aghai-Diba, pgs. 110-140). Thus it becomes self
evident that none of these legal regimes are capable of producing a sufficient
solution to the complex Caspian legal dispute. Therefore, the hypothesis is: "In
comparing the proposed legal regimes for the Caspian Sea, it becomes perfectly
clear that none of these options are capable of solving the Caspian puzzle."
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Approach to the Study
A specific Functionalist approach has been used to construct this study mainly
due to the fact that everything seems to be a sum of its parts in regards to the
numerous incidences of the Caspian Legal Issue. All variables in this study are
defined in terms of the role they have played or do play within the legal debate.
The functionalist methodology defines "things in terms of their causes and effects"
(Croissant, pg. 140). Take into consideration the case of Azerbaijan. With an 800

km long coastline, the country is advocating for the "Border Lake" status because
this would allow for the division of the Caspian Sea based on the centerline
principle, which would bequeath larger national sectors of the Caspian to those
littoral states with longer coastlines. Being on the other side of the issue due to its
shorter coastline, Iran has clearly dismissed such a measure as being not only unfair
not highly unrealistic because of the potential damaging conflict that could arise if
not all littoral states are satisfied. (Aras, pgs. 50-130). The cause in this case would
be Azerbaijan's initiative, which is then utilized to explain Iran's behavior (the
effect). Hence this is the main reason why the Functionalist outlook is most
conducive for this particular study. Furthermore, the Neo-Functionalist philosophy
will be utilized to explain the eventually resolution of this Caspian legal debate.
Taking inspiration from Enest B. Haas, the establishment of a legal regime for the
Caspian will only be possible through step by step integration of the littoral states.
Focusing on the most basic point and moving on to the less agreeable issues is the
main theme of this work (Haas, pgs. 45-50). In order to add balance to the study, a
Realists contrast will be included as well. For those unfamiliar with the Realists
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school of thought, Realists emphasize that nation-states are purely self-interested
and any action they take will be to further their own ambitions or to protect their
interests (Croissant, pg. 144).

Basic Overview
The Caspian Sea is estimated to contain about 15 .31 billion barrels of oil or
approximately 2% of the world's oil reserves. Also, it contains about 230-360
trillion cubic feet of gas, which is estimated to be about 7% of the world's gas
reserves (Bolukbasi, pgs. 397-414). Most of the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian
are located in its southern region extending from the Apsheron Peninsula of
Azerbaijan to Turkmenistan's Peri-Balkhan area (Bahgat, pgs.3-15). These
resources can significantly improve the struggling economies of the former Soviet
states within that region of the world. Yet without an established legal regime to
monitor the actions of the littoral states, those states with the most military and/or
political might can easily take control of resources that are clearly not within their
natural national boundaries. Furthermore, the lack of a clear title for the Caspian is
causing disputes to arise over the ownership of the resources within its seabed.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have clashed and continuing to argue over the
ownership rights of two oil fields in the Caspian. Both states are highly
economically underdeveloped and are in desperate need to capitalize on the
Caspian's rich oil and gas reserves. The situation is extremely dire for Azerbaijan
because very few foreigner investors are willingly to invest in any energy projects
that could be impeded by outside forces, especially after the incident where Iran
threaten a Azeri exploration ship that entered disputed water territory within the
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Caspian (Dekmejian, pgs. 70-100). But what kind of implications does this have
for the world? It is possible that the world's dependency on Middle Eastern oil
could become more severe if the oil reserves of the Caspian are left undeveloped
due to ownership disputes. Should this occur, the major Middle Eastern oil
producers, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, will be placed in a highly beneficial position
where they could easily manipulate oil prices in their favor. Clearly out of all the
littoral states, Iran would benefit the most from such an occurrence. Producing
about 3. 72 million barrels of crude oil per day just from its oil reserves in the
Persian Gulf, Iran is perfectly capable of delaying energy projects in the Caspian
without suffering any severe economic consequences. Although it is true that the
Russians also have sufficient oil reserves and currently do not need to extract the
Caspian's seabed, the oil within their disposal is highly sulfuric and therefore not as
rich or useful as the oil of the Persian Gulf. Taking into consideration America's
foreign policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, it would be to the determent of
the United States to allow Iran to amass a great deal of political power. Hence, the
Americans are fully supporting the Azeris in their oil and other energy projects in
the Caspian much to Iran's annoyance. Theoretically, the lack of a legal regime for
the Caspian has the potential of stalling energy development within the region and
stunting the economic growth of the already economically ravaged post-soviet
states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Dekmejian, pgs. 120-140). In
regards to policy analyses of this topic, the events which take place within the
Caspian as a result of the tensions over rights to the seabed resources has a
tremendous impact on American and European foreign policy.
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The Caspian Sea, located in Eurasia, is the largest and completely enclosed
body of water in the world (see Appendix A). Similar to the Great Lakes of the
United States and Canada, the Caspian has a very fragile ecosystem, sensitive to
pollutants like pesticides that run off nearby farms. About 90% of world's sturgeon
population, the famous caviar producing fish, are found in the salty waters of the
Caspian. Navigable waterways flow through lands near the Caspian, which connect
Europe to Central Asia. One of these routes, the Volga River, is so vital to the
Russians that it is protected by a major city by the name of Astrakhan, which is
located directly at the point where the Caspian feeds into the Volga. The lands
located on the Caspian's coastlines are perfectly temperate and therefore highly
farmable. Consequently, the growth of grains and starches such as rice and wheat is
best near the coastlines of the countries bordering the Caspian. Strangely enough,
Iran is the third largest state to border the Caspian yet in comparison to the other
smaller Caspian nations its land is less farmable. Five nation-states surround the
Caspian, Azerbaijan to the Southwest, Iran to the South, Russia to the North and
Northwest, Kazakhstan to the North and Northeast while Turkmenistan straddles its
Eastern shoreline (Rand Research Group, pgs. 10-20).

The Caspian as a Lake, Sea or Neither?
It wasn't until the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Iran in 1940 when

the legal status of the Caspian was defined. The Kremlin in Moscow and the
Shah's court in Tehran decided to retain the centuries old title of Sea for the
Caspian. Thus from 549 B.C. until 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed, the
Caspian was regarded as an enclosed Sea. In recent times, Russia and Iran
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originally argued that the Caspian is a lake, as defined by international law, and its
resources should therefore be jointly and equally exploited by the littoral states. Iran
has retained this stance but Russia has swayed back in forth on this issue. During
the Boris Yeltsin Presidency, Russia and Kazakhstan came to a compromise in
regards to the right of usage of the Caspian. A key clause in their accord would
allow all countries in the region to carry out their own exploration and production
projects while allowing for cooperation in international waters. Both countries
called on all parties to sign a convention "respecting sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence." The joint statement describes the completion
of a Caspian convention opening the way to industrial development at full speed.
Russia publicly supported the lake status of the Caspian as was set back in the
l 920's and l 940's but yet compromised with another littoral state in regards to the
Caspian sea's resources and water rights. It's highly contradictive. Iran maintains
that the Caspian Sea's legal status needs to be defined until any meaningful
exploration and/or extraction of the region's resources takes place. By default, in the
meantime the Caspian Sea is still bounded by the Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921
and 1940, which intentionally make no reference to mining rights only navigation
and fishing rights. Therefore Iran presses for the cooperation of the littoral states in
forging a plan or agreement as to how the resources of the Caspian will be fairly
distributed if extraction is absolutely imperative. Iran is willing to budge on this
stance if and only if every littoral state agrees to equally separate the Caspian into
national sectors with each state holding 20% of both the water and seabed (Gale,
pg. 4 ). Russia has taken different positions on the Caspian at various times since
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the fall of the Soviet Union. Initially, the federated republic of Russia supported a
condominium status for the Caspian along with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
However, Russia backed down from this position after signing various treaties with
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in regards to the ownership of certain subsurface
resources. Hence, Russia now asserts that the Caspian be referred to as an
"International Lake" and should be partitioned accordingly (Mirfenderesk, pgs. 75160). The following is a break down of all options available for the establishment
of a legal status for the Caspian:

Sea Legal Status
Should the Caspian be labeled as an international Sea, the five countries
bordering its shores must be entitled to individually exploit their separate seabed
resources without interference from the other four nations. United Nations
Convention Law of the Sea of 1982 will apply. Specifics of UN CLOS provisions
provide that each littoral state be given a territorial sea with a breadth not exceeding
twelve miles, an exclusive economic zone not exceeding 200 miles and a
continental shelf. This would mean the three new independent states, would be
giving their own national sectors equal to that of all states in the region. (Crandall,
pgs. 40-49).

Lake Legal Status
Under the legalities of international law regulating lakes, use of border lakes is
regulated by international agreements between affected states which would also
determine lines of state borders, navigational rights and the terms of use of waters
for non-navigation purposes (Crandall, pgs. 50-59).
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Condominium Legal Status
Out of all the international labels for bodies, none are more confusing or more
misunderstood than condominiums. The term condominium refers to the common
use of a body of water by all countries within its vicinity. This would mean that the
use of the Caspian along with its subsurface resources would only be permissible to
the five littoral states. Each state would get an equal share of the revenues
produced by the sell of hydrocarbon resources and share in the expenses of their
extraction (Crandall, pgs. 60-79).

Research Purpose
The legal status of the Caspian Sea as defined and analyzed in this study seeks
to converge all existing works on the topic at hand into one comprehensive study.
Each littoral state's stance on the Caspian issue will be discussed in detail along
with the rational behind their positions. Existing studies have done well in
providing facts about Caspian legal dispute but have fallen short in their
explanations of certain phenomenon. For instance, the reasons for Russia's sudden
change in their Caspian policy are rarely ever discussed in great detail.
Unfortunately no existing work to date has adequately addressed this concern due to
the lack of information available to those scholars at the time of their research. It is
perhaps of great fortune that numerous articles have been written in regards to the
distinct reasons for the Russians apparent divide and conquer Caspian policy.
Hence, the gap between policy and action can finally be filled with the appropriate
scholastic information. In addition to the policy shifts of the littoral states, this
work on the Caspian Sea attempts to explain the political conduct of the five littoral
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states in regards to this issue from a cognitive perspective. A state's national
psyche plays an imperative role in policy development that is normally overlooked
by political scientists. Another important element in the study is the impact and
significance of historical events on the modem developments of the Caspian legal
dispute. Do the past treaties signed by the Iran (Persia) and Russia (Soviet Union)
have an impact on the way these countries shape their Caspian policies and if so to
what extent? By the conclusion of this work, it will become very clear that those
treaties exceeding almost a century ago have had a profound influence on the legal
disputes surrounding the Caspian. In fact, the foundations of the Caspian legal
dispute were established during the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World
War. Essentially, this study focuses on three main questions:
1. What are the Caspian policies of each littoral state?
2. Why do the littoral states hold those policies?
3. How can a compromise be reached in regards to this issue?
The first two questions are easily identifiable due to their concrete nature.
However, the third question is a policy topic and thus must be studied from an
idealist perspective. Therefore, the bulk of the study will concentrate on questions
one and two while question three will mainly comprise the conclusion of the work.
This work will cover the policy gap of the littoral states in regards to the Caspian
Sea.

The Research Design
Within the first section of the study, a comprehensive yet brief introduction to
the legal dispute of the Caspian is provided to the reader(s) along with some
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background knowledge of the Caspian the likes of which include geological facts
and general-relevant details of the littoral states. The second section will focus on
the recent history of the dispute. Ensuing the discussion on the legalities of titles,
the official stance of every littoral state will be provided as well as the current
policies being utilized to lessen disputes over ownership and navigational rights to
the Caspian. Fourth on the list is the North-South Corridor and its impact on the
Legal Dispute as a whole. Before the conclusion, a section will be dedicated to the
available solutions to the Caspian question.

Concluding Remarks
While reading through this particular study the reader(s) should keep in
mind that this legal dispute transcends economic interests and crosses into the realm
of political rivalry and intrigue. It is unfortunate that many scholars approach this
issue with an oversimplified model of study and hope to achieve the impossible by
stating a naYve solution to the issue. Simple solutions to this legal dispute do not
exist. If an appropriate solution was available this work would haven't been
initiated. One must strive to remember that the Caspian Sea is an instrument used
to manipulate the puppets of the world and make them do their biding without
consciously being aware of it.
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Chapter Two
The History of the Dispute
Introduction
Historically, the Caspian has been referred to as an ocean, sea and gulf by
the ancient people who inhabited the coastal lands. Many Empires of the world
attempted to control as much of it as possible before inscribing its story as the
forgotten chapters of history. What were these ambitious nations after? Naturally
they were after control of the chain of rivers flowing out from the salty waters of
the Caspian and into the heart of Eastern Europe, hydrocarbon resources and
influence over the nations located around it (Bolukbasi, pgs. 397-414). Although its
oil and gas potentials are largely still unknown, there is enough of these
hydrocarbon resources to trigger some desperately needed growth in the ailing
economies of the post soviet states within that region (Mehdiyoum, pgs. 179). But
without a legal regime to define the status of the area, disputes over commonly
claimed sectors and resources frequently occur. Until the early twentieth century,
the Caspian was completely dominated by one Eurasia force, Russia. When the
Peacock throne was left vacant by the ethnic Turkic Qajars in Persia (Iran), a
military leader by the name of Reza Khan quickly consolidated his power over the
country and forged the modem nation-state of Iran. A year after the fall of the
Qajar dynasty, the new regime in Tehran met with Soviet delegates to discuss the
numerous issues of the Caspian. Discontent over the pervious treaties between
Tsarist Russia and Persia over legal rights to the Caspian had reached the point of
intolerability for the Iranians. Eager to exert its influence over the oil rich
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neighboring country, the Soviet regime quickly agreed to the Iranian demands of
returning Iranian territory forcefully captured by the Tsar, which included a naval
base on the island of Ashuradeh and port in Bandar-e Anzali. Furthermore, the
Russians denounced a pervious treaty that forbade Iran from launching armed
vessels into the Caspian while granting equal rights of free navigation. The
document in which these rights were ascribed on became know as the Perso-Russo
Treaty of Friendship singed the 26 of February 1921. This was the first step taken
on the road to future conflict over the legal rights to the Caspian. By granting only
Russian and Iranian ships from freely navigating the waters of the Caspian, the
Soviet Union and Persia (Iran) asserted that the body of water in between them was
exclusive. Who was it including and excluding? In those times, the Soviet Union
was comprised of a plethora of diverse nations yet the treaty made no mention of
them. According to the articles of the Perso-Russo treaty of 1921, the only two
countries allowed to have ships of any kind on the Caspian are the Soviet Union and
Iran. So countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are not
privileged to these navigational rights because the treaty made no mention of them
(Jalali, pgs. 7-8). Perhaps an argument could be made on their behalf claiming
these countries to the successor states of the Soviet Union and therefore eligible to
receive all the rights listed within the Persian-Russian contract. However, this
effort would be moot since the treaty that finalized Iranian and Russian authority
over the Caspian was signed nearly two decades later. Thus, the focus of this
chapter is on the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1940 and its unprecedented impact on the
controversial Caspian Legal debate plaguing the littoral states of the region. To
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declare the Treaty of 1940 as the seed from which the conflicts surrounded the
Caspian Sea sprouted, would be in no way be an exaggeration or overstatement.
The treaty to be discussed in the following pages was forged with the intention of
dividing the Caspian into two permanent spheres of influence to ensure Russia and
Iran would always hold the majority of the sway over the region. Due to this fact
alone, the other littoral states have denounced the treaty as both unfair and insulting.

Caspian Sea's Status in the World War II Era
Just one year prior to being expelled from Iran by the Allies of World War
II, Reza Shah Pahlavi made one decisive deal with his counterpart Joseph Stalin. In
a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran, the Caspian Sea would be
officially regarded as an enclosed Sea and a condominium regime would regulate
its usage by the two parties privileged to the deal. Of course no boundaries were
drawn to elude which parts of the Caspian belonged to either the Soviets or Iranians
for that would have been in direct violation of the condominium regime. Such a
legal status is created on the basis of equal rights and usage to a single body of
water along with its resources by all parties involved. Hence, the Soviet-Iranian
Treaty of 1940 further reiterated other treaties in that it yet again asserted the
Caspian as an Iranian-Soviet Sea in more diplomatic terms. According to article 12
of the treaty, each country was given "an exclusive right of fishing in its coastal
waters up to a limit often nautical miles", later expanded to twelve. Absolutely no
vessels of any third nation were allowed in the Caspian. This gave the new
"progressive" regime in Tehran and the radicals in Moscow a tremendous amount
of hydrocarbon reserves. However the treaty made no mention of oil exploration or
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drilling within the Caspian. Even if the Caspian's great potential for oil and gas had
been discovered in the early forties neither the Soviet Union nor Iran had the
sophisticated technology needed for their extraction. Other than one boundary
drawn from Astara to Hosse in Gholi Khan between the two countries, there were no
other lines separating the Caspian into Soviet and Iranian spheres of control.
Possession of any oil fields discovered further than ten nautical miles from each
nation's coastline would have definitely been disputed. Interestingly, the treaty
intentionally bypassed any issues of ownership to the water territory and
hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea. It can only be assumed that all resources
extracted outside of given space would have been portioned equally in a typical
condominium fashion. Yet even in such a case, no one could be sure that the
Soviets or Iranians would have done so because the treaty only mentions fishing
and navigation rights not resource extraction rights. Take for example the Soviet
drilling of the oil fields off the coast of modem day Azerbaijan, which extended far
more than ten nautical miles from the coast. Not obliged to split the revenues made
from the exploitation of the oil, the Soviets offered to make no payments to Iran.
Even though the resource extracted could have been considered a possession of
both countries instead of just one, Iran failed to voice any objections to the Soviets'
actions. It could be argued the Iranians were under the assumption that if they were
to stumble upon hydrocarbon resources further than ten nautical miles from their
coast they would be permitted to drill them without objection from the Soviets.
Whether it was for better or worse, Iran didn't get the opportunity to test its theory
but one positive outcome from Iran' s silence to Soviet drilling activities was that it
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established de facto boundaries in the Caspian between the two countries. Soviet
ships would not pass a certain point in the Caspian given that Iran followed suite.
Today these imaginary boundaries are used by the Soviet Union's successor states.
Never the less, the intention of the 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaty was to split the
Caspian into two unofficial zones with the North belonging to the Soviet and the
South to the Iranians. For fifty-one years the treaty did exactly what it was created
to accomplish. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all previous deals made
between the USSR and Iran were not honored by the Soviet successor states and the
deficiencies of the 1940 treaty ripen the fruits of legal conflict over the ownership
of the subsurface resources of the Caspian Sea (Janusz, pgs. 1-8).

The Rebirth of the Dispute
In the year 1994 the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a well written letter to
the English Embassy in Moscow polity warning the British that the ownership over
the Caspian had remained unsettled and any activities conducted off the coast of the
littoral states was highly restricted. The bulk of the letter focused around the
investment deal made between the Azerbaijani government and the British
Petroleum Company. From this letter, it became apparent the Russians weren't
going to allow foreign investors to freely invest in the extraction of hydrocarbon
resources in the Caspian. Even after the fall of their Empire and rise of the new
nation-states, the Russia's still believed the Northern half of the Caspian was under
their patronage. For a littoral state like Azerbaijan to invite a European investor to
invest in their petroleum industry was a small manifestation of betrayal. Just one
year prior to the writing of the letter, the Russians had supported the military
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insurrection lead by Colonel Suret Huseynov and rise of Heydar Aliyev in
Azerbaijan. They even back Aliyev when Suret turned against him and attempted
to forcefully remove him from power. Yet the Russians had underestimated Aliyev
and his ambitious plans to expand Azerbaijan's petroleum industry. Going one step
further to hinder Aliyev's plans, the Russian Foreign Ministry wrote another letter
to the United Nations in the same year explaining the reasons why international
maritime laws did not apply to the Caspian. In their defense, the Russians pleading
that there is an absence of a legal regime for the Caspian, the provisions of the
Soviet-Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 still applied and all littoral states had a
duty to recognize them. So were the Russians indirectly stating that the Caspian
was still a Soviet-Iranian Sea? Such an assumption would be ludicrous since the
Soviet Union no longer existed. What the Russians were asserting was that no
littoral state could conduct drilling or exploration activities exceeding twelve
nautical miles from their coastlines. This was problematic for the Azeris because
they had hoped to not only drill outside of the permitted area but also send
exploration ships to scan the seabed for hydrocarbon materials. Striking back with
their own rational, the Azeris declared the illegitimacy of the Soviet-Iranian treaties
on several key issues. The treaties never made any references to mineral
development and the Soviets themselves conducted oil drilling outside of the twelve
nautical mile zone without consulting Iran. The Azeris also made it clear the zones
created by the USSR for each former Soviet littoral state are legitimate and
therefore should be recognized as international boundaries. Russia was not
impressed by Azerbaijan's line of reasoning and made a very risky move by
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renouncing the Azeri's stance publicly. Subsequently, the littoral states got
involved by lending the majority of their support to the Russians. Kazakhstan
favored the splitting of the Caspian into national sectors based on the USSR
division plan, which greatly favored Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Yet the Kazakh
government voiced its concern over the lack of a legal regime to regulate maritime
and ecological issues. Turkmenistan also made it evident that a joint venture was
necessary to establish a legitimate legal regime for the Caspian. Iran practically
reiterated the same concern and communicated to the other littoral states that in the
absence of a legal regime the provisions of the Soviet-Iranian treaty must still
apply. Although never formalized, Iran and Russia had an unspoken agreement to
aid one another to protect their interests in the Caspian. Brave enough to defy the
Russo-Iranian alliance was Azerbaijan, the only littoral state that objected to the
initiative and set itself up for attacks by the other littoral states. However the
political atmosphere would soon change in Azerbaijan's favor after Iran's costly
move to normalize relations with the United States (Amirahmadi, pgs. 68-92).

Competing Interest in the Region
The second term of former Iranian reformist President Muhammad Khatami
was a time of great hopes for the citizenry of the Iranian nation and the politicians
in Washington D.C. who were eager to bring Iran under their sphere of influence
once again. Although Khatami had been working on reestablishing links with the
United States throughout his first term as President of the Islamic Republic, no
serious gains were made until the year 1997 when the reformists in Iran had the
necessary support and power to push their agenda in Maj/es-Iranian Parliament. On
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the other side of the Atlantic, the Politicians interpreted Khatami' s efforts to
normalize relations as a friendly gesture and they were willing to work with him to
bring about more socio-economic reforms in Iran. Upon witnessing Iran's attempt
to draw closer to the United States, the Russians felt alienated and feared friendly
relations between Washington and Tehran might threaten its sovereignty over the
Caspian Sea. With Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan sitting and waiting for the best
opportunity to reassert their Caspian claims, Russia decided to relinquish some
sovereignty for security. In the following year, Moscow announced a new plan for
the partitioning of the Caspian Sea that nearly mirrored that of Azerbaijan's. The
Caspian was to be divided into national sectors based on individually engineered
compromises between all littoral states. Russia was the first to strike by signing
deals with both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in regards to water boundaries. With
this decisive action, Russia ensured the loyalty of the two most active littoral states
in a time where Russian interests were in grave danger in that part of the world.
Back in Tehran, the reformists became outraged by Russia's deals with the Kazakhs
and Azeris while the conservative elements in the government were granted the
necessary ammunition they needed to kill Khatami's pro-American initiatives.
Arguing that if Iran pursued better relations with the United States, the Russians
would take even more drastic measures to secure their Caspian interests. At the
time, Iran depended heavily on Russia to provide it with arms and medicines.
Further elaborating, the Conservatives asserted that the risk of losing Russia as a
trading partner was greater than gaining the United States as a de-facto ally.
Khatami's efforts were all in vain for the Maj/es fatefully decided to put an end to
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his plans. Following the Iranian Parliament's decision, Russia reassumed its former
position on Iran, which meant the Iranians were given as much time needed to
conclude a separate treaty with Azerbaijan over territorial boundaries in the
Caspian. Stating the need for both the Azeris and Iranians to civilly reach an
agreement on this issue, the Russians failed to condemn Iran for using military
force to expel an Azeri navigation ship that wandered into disputed waters on
August 28, 2001 (Crandall, pgs. 200-300). Yet again after eight decades it was
clear the Russians along with the Iranians still regarded the Caspian as a RussianIranian Sea.

Concluding Remarks
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the parameters for the partitioning of the
Caspian between the new successor states of the USSR and Iran were not very
clear. As mentioned before, the previous treaties made between Iran and the
Soviets made no mention of ownership to the various parts of the Caspian or its
subsurface hydrocarbon resources. It came as no surprise then that the various
littoral states immediately began disputing over navigation and ownership rights in
the Caspian. The Azerbaijani leadership spearheaded a movement calling for Iran
and Russia to recognize the former Soviet boundaries drawn after the final SovietIranian treaty of 1940. Initially defending the original claim of condominium, Iran
maintained that those boundaries were internal divisions within the Soviet Union.
Internationally, such lines held absolutely no legitimacy. Backing their former
Caspian co-owner, Russia reasserted Iran's claim for the continuation of the
condominium regime. Fearing the renewed Russo-Iranian alliance, the three
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remaining littoral states banded together and renounced all previous Caspian
treaties. After Iran's attempt to reconsolidate relations with the United States in
1997, the Russians responded by changing their position on the Caspian. Instead of
supporting a condominium status for the Caspian, the Russians decided to back a
legal regime that would claim the Caspian Sea more or less as an international lake.
At about the same time, the Azerbaijanis signed treaties with the Kazakhs and the
Russians in regards to territorial claims to the Caspian. In accordance to their deals,
the boundaries drawn by the Soviet Union marking each state's zone in the Caspian
were to be respected and upheld. Iran immediately objected and sought to befriend
the only littoral state other than itself not to support this measure, the Republic of
Turkmenistan. The Turkmen President was highly displeased by Azerbaijan's
negotiations with Russia and Kazakhstan for one imperative reason; the Azeris were
promoting a plan that gave each former Soviet state a national sector in Caspian
based on the length of its coastline. This meant that the Turkmenistan government
would have had to settle for the smallest national sector in the Caspian among the
post-Soviet nations. Though an alliance between the theocratic regime in Tehran
and the secular government in Ashgabat didn't ferment until later, the basis of the
Caspian conflict was established. Issues were complicated further when the
Azerbaijani government in Baku announced that the Caspian should be divided up
on in accordance to the median line method or each country's coastline length. To
better understand the significance of Baku's action, one needs to realize that Iran
has the shortest coastline and subsequently the median line method would leave
Iran with only a scrap of the Caspian. Before the break up of the Soviet Union, Iran
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had more or less the entire southern portion of the Caspian to itself. Tehran was not
ready to accept a plan that intended on weakening Iranian sovereignty over the
Caspian Sea. Another pertinent issue of the Caspian is navigation rights of not just
the Sea but also the lakes connected to it. From Iran's perspective, all states should
be permitted to navigate freely in Caspian waters with the exception of ten nautical
miles off the Iranian coast, which was reserved to Iran for fishing purposes in the
1940 treaty. Obviously the other states have not honored this and it has lead to
some show of force from Iran toward Azerbaijan (Herzig, pgs. 503-517). Had the
1940 treaty defined navigation in more precise terms, it might have been possible to
apply them to the current situation and avoid the latter conflict. Both the Soviets
and Iranians were not interested in being delicate with details that they viewed as
irrelevant. But with some foresight it is very clear that such an issue is not in the
least bit insignificant. As a matter of fact, the Russians and Iranians had the
foresight to predict challenges to their authority in the Caspian might one day arise
and consequently they prepared well for such a day.
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Chapter Three
Available Solutions
Introduction
Now that a firm understanding of the background has been established, it is
necessary to observe the Caspian legal dispute from yet another dimension, the
theoretical aspect. What is really implied when the Caspian is regarded as an
international sea or lake and why would either of these nominal definitions cause
distress or joy for the littoral states? Essentially, there are only three legal titles that
can be allotted to the Caspian and each of them contains different legal
implications.
The first title is that of an international Sea as defined by the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea established in 1982 before the dissolution of the
USSR. From the date of its inception, it has had a silent effect on the various
nations of the world; whether it succeeds or fails in resolving dispute, few ever hear
of it.
Second is the International Lake status. Unlike international Seas, lakes are
not regulated by a single governing body, but rather by the countries, which have a
stake within the body of water in question. Usually only those states with open
water ways in their territory linked to the body of water under dispute entertain this
idea.
Last and least favored, is the status of a condominium. Only the first two
options are seriously being considered due to the fragile interests involved.
Condominiums required states to surrender a significant amount of their
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sovereignty in order for the system to function properly. As of right now, the
Caspian Sea is the front line of a legal battle where alliances shift readily especially
in the case of the Federated States of Russia. Hence, it's every man for him self and
no one is willing to surrender an ounce of power held tightly in his grasp. Then it
can be deduced that the Caspian legal issue is between two main camps each
enthusiastically opposing one another. Proponents of the lake status comprise the
first camp and contrasting them is the second camp in favor of the Sea plan (AghaiDiba, pgs. 200-289). Within this chapter, the pros and cons of each status will be
examined along with the each states official position on the Caspian legal issue.
Also, the rational of the littoral states' decisions to support one status in favor of
another will be thoroughly studied leaving no factor of this issue unexplored.

International Law of Sea
According to Article 7 6 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the borders of a nation located near a body of water can be expanded on the
basis of an elaborate set of criteria, which define the water depth, seafloor geology
and sediment thickness along with the distance from the coastline. Currently, there
are eighty countries in this world that can potentially benefit from this provision and
it's no quo-incidence that Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are
among those countries. The length of Azerbaijan's Caspian coastline is 800km,
Russia posses 18.5 percent of the coastline and Kazakhstan has a coastline of about
l,894km long. On the other hand, Iran has the shortest coastline bordering the
Caspian; measuring only 740km. Meanwhile Turkmenistan has a length of
1,768km long, exceeding that of Azerbaijan but just falling short of Russia and
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Kazakhstan. As logic would predict, the countries that have the potential of gaining
more from this measure would support it. Oddly enough, only Azerbaijan has
thrown all if its political weight behind the Sea initiative while Kazakhstan has
shown favorable tendencies for it but not absolute support. How can such a strange
event be explained? Through simple calculations that reveal the truth behind this
issue. Should the Caspian be declared a Sea, Article 76 of the UNCLS would go
into effect giving the majority of hydrocarbon resources to Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's national zone in the Caspian would be
significantly larger than that of its neighbor Iran. Ever since Baku peacefully
attained its independence from Moscow, the Azeri leadership has been
unsuccessfully attempting to discretely steer clear from Tehran's influences and
allying itself with Western powers. Denying an already Oil wealthy Iran of more
petroleum revenues would help ensure Tehran won't have the necessary financial
strength to support the dormant Islamic forces within Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan on
the other hand is not really worried about the threat of radical Muslims bent on
establishing an Islamic Republic. President Nazarbayev of the Kazakh Republic is
more focused on the large hydrocarbon reserves located off his country's coast,
which would be guaranteed to him if the Caspian should be legally defined as a Sea.
Turkmenistan and Russia have no interests in gaining larger national sectors of the
Caspian if those sections contain no oil or gas reserves. This is especially the case
for Turkmenistan, since it has no other sources for oil or gas and is seeking to lower
its dependency on Russia for hydrocarbon resources (Aras, pgs. 175-230).

International Law of Lakes
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Unlike Seas, International Lakes give do not require states to relinquish a
large degree of their sovereignty to be effective. Usage and ownership of
international lakes are based on a body of established rules organized by the all
affected states. The United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes established by the UNECE
obligates all parties to work together in regards to pollution control along lake
monitoring, research and development, consultations, warning-alarm systems,
exchange of protection along with information, mutual assistance and institutional
arrangements. None of its provision mentions methods of division, rights to
subsurface resources or navigation of the lake itself. This system has been created
in such a way as to give parties the ability to compromise on those issues freely and
privately. Rivers connected to the international Lake can only be used by those
ships with the necessary authorization for usage. Permission is granted by the
owner(s) of the rivers. In practical terms, the Russians would have the ability to
legally deny a neighboring country or another foreign entity from using the Volga
River to ship their goods to Eastern European Markets. For the Islamic Republic of
Iran, not being permitted to use the Volga would not hurt the economy because
items can still be exported to foreign countries through the use of the Persian Gulf.
Yet for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the Volga is the only logical
route to ship their Oil and Gas to eager European markets. Russia could shut the
economies of these countries under the provisions of International Lakes but this
would give them no benefit in the long run. Should the Russians wish to exert too
much influence over their former proxy' s in a limited amount of time, the
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threatened states may tum to Iran for assistance. With the longest coastline on the
Persian Gulf, Iran would be more than happy to ship its fellow littoral state's
hydrocarbon resources to Europe for a substantial fee. Even though the cargo
would without a doubt take a considerably longer amount of time to reach its
destination, it is never the less a viable option. Therefore the Russians have not
actively pushed nor show much enthusiasm for this option. They do not wish to
upset the delicate balance of power between them and Iranians in the Caspian
region, which is the main reason why the Russians initially supported the retention
of the Condominium status (Amirahmadi, pgs. 150-194).

Condominium
When compared to all other legal titles recognized by the international
community, Condominium is the least understood and used infrequently. To give
an elementary definition, Condominium refers to the sharing of a common body of
water. Usually this includes not only navigational rights, but resource rights as
well. Yet if the parties establishing the Condominium want to place restrictions
and/or exceptions on the status, they have the freedom to do so. For better or for ill,
there are no set rules for Condominiums. So as long as every nation-state or any
other political entity agrees to the conditions set forth by the congregation, no
objections can be made by any third party. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the
party members to punish transgressions. If one state chooses to violate the
provisions created by the Condominium and no consequences follow, then the legal
regime will eventually seize to exist. At point the Caspian Sea was governed by a
Condominium regime created by the Soviets and Iranians. Despite a few violations,
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the two countries chose to respect each others rights as defined by the treaties that
established their legal regime. Due to the very nature of the Condominium, the
Azerbaijanis were the first to speak out against it. The Russians, Kazakhs and
Turkmen were unable to quell Azerbaijan's defiance and opted to abandon the
Condominium option. It wasn't long after when Tehran changed its stance on the
Condominium status from favorable to unfavorable (Cohen, pgs. 45-88).

The Various Stances of the Littoral States
The Russian Stance

When the Russians said goodbye to Karl Marx and hello to Samuel Adams,
the Russian absolute dominance of Central Asia and the Transcaucasia also came to
an end. However, the Russians did manage to attain a certain level of power over
the newly independent littoral states in regards to oil and gas supplies. Near the end
of the 20th century, Russian pipelines supplied Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan with valuable hydrocarbon resources. The situation grew dire for
Russia as the Kazakh and Azeri Republics began developing their hydrocarbon
resources in their respected territories. Turkmenistan looked to Iran to begin a new
pipeline project through the latter as an alternative route of supplying the Western
half of the World with gas. In the midst of all these challenges to Russian
dominance, the leadership in Moscow formulated a plan to salvage as much power
it could over the Caspian and newly independent littoral states, divide and conquer.
On the tenth of January 2002, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan met in
Moscow to talk in regards to consolidating borders on the Caspian. This event took
place shortly after a Russia's new proposal had been rejected by Iran due to
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unfavorable conditions. With the Turkmen's backing Iran, Russia couldn't
consolidate enough support to silence Iran and thus suffered a moral loss. A former
World Power could not longer overpower a state that it had once occupied and
controlled. The only option for Russia was to deal with Iran's rival Azerbaijan and
even go as far as to seduce Turkmenistan with a more favorable division plan. It
appeared that the Russians couldn't turn former Turkmen President Niyazov from
the Iran. Azerbaijan however was more than willing to deal with Moscow and a
deal was successfully concluded with the Russians. Following the conclusion of the
Azeri deal, Moscow concluded a border deal with the Kazakhs on May 13, 2002.
Angered and cheated, the Iranians objected to both deals while condemning the
Russians for taking unilateral action. After the Azeris and Iranians came close to
military confrontation in contest waters, the Russians didn't blatantly blame the
Iranians for the dispute but rather called upon the two countries to make peace and
sign a border treaty. Once the Russian relations with Iran warmed up, Moscow
announced a revised version of their former plan that called for the division of the
Caspian Sea based on a variation of the median line method, which splits a body of
water down through the center. In partitioning the Caspian, the dividing line must
be equidistant from the coast, issues concerning the median line of division should
be resolved through agreements between all five littoral states and the basis of the
division should be the water level measurements taken on the

1st

of January 1998.

The Russians currently assert the Caspian Sea should be broken into national
sectors with a common Condominium in the center regulated by a legal regime.
Under this plan the Caspian would not be deemed a Lake, Sea or even a true
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Condominium but rather simple an international body of water (Gale, pgs. 4-6).

The Azeri Stance
The Republic of Azerbaijan has been struggling to keep its territorial
integrity, national economy, and sovereign authority in tact ever since it declared
independence from the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991. Immediately after its
declaration of independence, the new nation-state of Azerbaijan had to deal with
two major uprisings within the south and southwest regions of the country. These
challenges were just the beginning to a plethora of problems that would haunt
Azerbaijan for years to come. One of these challenges is the ailing Azeri economy.
Azerbaijan is unable to create new employment opportunities for its own people.
This is causing a great deal of political unrest. Fearing the wrath of the starving
impoverished Azeri people, the government of Azerbaijan has been trying to seduce
foreign investors with its Caspian oil and gas reserves as part of a greater plan to
boost the economy. Due to the absence of a defined legal regime for the Caspian
Sea, oil exploration and drilling is highly limited. Rising to the challenge,
Azerbaijan has quickly taken the initiative to announce a plan for the partition of
the Caspian Sea based on the centerline-median principle that differs considerable
from that of the Russians. In common terms, the length of every littoral states
Caspian coastline would determine the size of their national sector. With their
western portion bordering the oil rich waters of the Caspian, Azerbaijan would be
one of the key beneficiaries of this plan. Other littoral states in similar positions
have shown favorable tendencies toward this initiative by signing treaties with the
Azerbaijan to this regard. The Azeris signed a deal with the Kazakhs to establish

31

their national sectors in the Fall of2001. Three years later, on September 23, 2002,
the Russian Federation signed an agreement of division of the adjacent areas of the
Caspian Sea bed with Azerbaijan (Croissant, pgs.170-200).

The Kazakh Stance
Similar to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan faces difficult economically challenges
crippling the nation and stunting its growth. The former Soviet state of Kazakhstan
holds about 3.3% of the world's hydrocarbon reserves. What this means is that the
President of Kazakhstan is basically sitting on a mountain of oil and gas. Recently,
a Kazakh oil company had just discovered a new oil field on the shelf of the
Caspian. Apparently the speculations made about the site some time before the oil
discover were correct. With every sign of the growing presence of oil, the Kazakhs
are growing more hopeful for the future. Investment from W estem nations like the
United Kingdom can go a long way in terms of boosting the ailing Kazakh
economy. Although actually drilling and extraction of the oil won't take place any
sooner than 2010, the Kazakh government is already looking for potential investors
in the West. In 2006, Kazakhstan extracted 65 million tones of oil and gas
condensate. Yet economic growth remains stagnant at best and the country is still
not stable as the leadership would like it to be. Massive energy projects must be
undertaken ifthe Kazakh leadership hopes to build unity and bring about prosperity
in the form of economic stability. This would mean exploring for even more oil
and gas fields in areas under dispute. Before the Russians renounced the archaic
Soviet-Iranian treaties, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan gave his
support to the Russians while also iterating that a compromise must be made
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between all littoral states to redefine the status of the Caspian. When the Russians
became willing to deal with the littoral states to establish official boundaries on the
Caspian, the Kazakhstan pounced on the opportunity. By signing the treaty with
Russia in 2003, Kazakhstan as given its support to Russian's Median Line Method
of Division and recognizes the Caspian as a the world most largest enclosed body of
Sea Water (Suleimanov, pgs. 50-1258).

The Iranian Stance
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most sincere of all the littoral states in
respects to its stance on the legal title of the Caspian Sea. Contrasting Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Russia, the Iranians believe in the principles of the law of
international Sea's outlined by the UNCSL. Based on those principles, the Caspian
would be divided into equal portions for all littoral states. No major oil or gas
reserves are located off Iran's coast and this plan would give them a share of the
Caspian oil located in the mid point between itself and Azerbaijan. Not
surprisingly, the only littoral state to support Iran's stance is Turkmenistan, another
nation with more to gain through this innovative (Mamedyarov, pgs. 1-2).

The Turkmen Stance
With no major hydrocarbon reserves located along Turkmenistan's Caspian
coastline, the Turk.men's have thrown their weight behind the Islamic Republic of
Iran in hopes of not just getting their pipeline financed but to also gain a few oil
and/or gas reserves. Turkmenistan has stood by Iran's side on the Caspian issue
and as a result of this steady loyalty, the legal problem has not been resolved. If
one country oppose a plan accepted by all.other Caspian countries, that
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can be

persuaded to change its position or suffer dire consequences of an economic,
political and perhaps even of military nature. Yet with the assistance of a second
party, an opponent can not easily be compelled to reverse its position on an issue or
be silenced. Turkmenistan provides Iran with the necessary aid to oppose the
littoral states' position on the Caspian and push its agenda forward (Joyner, pgs.
173-216).

Concluding Remarks
From this section, one learns that the Caspian Legal Dispute can be
simplified along ideological lines based on economic and political benefits. There
are two main camps of thought, the countries favoring a modified version of the
Lake Status and the countries who wish to define the Caspian as an International
Sea. Though the former significantly outnumbers the latter, the other camp has
enough influence and power to stall the progression of the legal dispute. In the past
a third camp, the condominium, existed with some support but eventually lost favor
over time due to its none opportunistic nature (Stein, pgs. 1-2). It would appear the
littoral states have chosen a stance they are comfortable with and will most likely
hold their ground. Yet nothing is for certain, should the Russia's feel an urge to
switch camps as part of their divide and conquer mentality the dispute may enter
into a much more complicated phase of its existence. On the other, if the unstable
governments of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Iran fall it could cause one of two
reactions:
The new established order in any of these countries might decide to reach a
settlement quickly even if it means giving in to certain demands.
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A radical regime might further the progression of conflict between the
littoral states, which might lead to a bloody war in the Caspian region. Whatever
the future has in store for the littoral states, one can be certain that the Caspian issue
won't be resolved quickly.
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Chapter Four
The Littoral States
Introduction
Russia's bilateral negotiations with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have been
met with acute opposition from Iran along with a passive form of resistance from
the conservative Turkmen. To complicate matters it appears every littoral state has
its own subconscious agenda that manifests itself in the form of sporadic
disagreements. Viewing the current Caspian situation from the ground level little
appears to be clear or coherent. This is precisely the reason why one must look at
this dispute from a good vantage point. Up to the following point of this study,
various facts and strategies have been thoroughly reviewed without scratching too
deeply into the surface of policy. Within the following chapter, the vital importance
of policy will be fully examined from multiple perspectives to give the reader(s) a
complete understanding of the issue at light. Knowing the official stances of the
littoral states in regards to the Caspian Legal Dispute is only of use when one can
apply these pieces of information to the policy decisions of each state. For better or
for ill, policy issues not only involve and affect the nations involved but they also
have the tendency to impact the rest of the world as well. A failed policy may
increase gas prices or even reduce the stock of fuel, which would drastically change
the current state of the struggling economy. On the other hand, a successful policy
can help the economy to recover from a long and damaging recession. Yet the
outcome of a particular policy is relative to what or who it involves. Although there
are numerous Caspian policy decisions available to study, only the most influential
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of these will be reviewed in depth. Hence, the relatively new North-South Corridor
project is the central focus of this chapter. Unlike limited pipeline projects
involving only one of the littoral states with a handful of European countries, the
North-South Corridor goes beyond the Caspian region and places the interest of
Southeast Asian and European nations at stake. It also empowers two of the largest
littoral states that do not have the most reputable positions among the democratic
nations of the world. Furthermore, it would not be an understatement to propose
that the international market can be severely weakened or strengthened by the
actions of those two countries. Such a fact has sparked the interests of the United
States, which at the current time does not have very friendly relations with these
nation-states (Cantle, pgs. 44 7-480). Perhaps the most interesting point of this
matter is how a single project involving three distinct nations could weave a
complex system of webs representing the various interest of each nation involved.

The Creation of a Caspian Project
In a world filled with adversaries waiting for the most opportune time to
strike, the Russians and Iranians were being continuously shunned by the western
powers financing the various kinds of innovative trade routes to expand free
commerce with Asia. Not taking kindly to the discrimination, the Indo-European
speaking peoples of Russia and Iran decided to open up the old avenues of trade
closed for some time after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Seeing the immense
potential these countries held, the Indians were eager to open their arms to both Iran
and Russia for the advancement of their own plans. As one can deduce from a
world map, India has limited trading avenues in which it can quickly and safely
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transport goods to Europe. Being located north of the Persian Gulf and South of the
Caspian, Iran is the perfect host for a corridor that would run straight across the
nation. From the Caspian Sea, the goods can be shipped to the famous Russian port
city of Astrakhan and in turn sent down the Volga River to Western Europe.
Observing the blue prints of the plan, one is made to believe that this a special kind
of situation that only produces winners. India can quickly send its products to
Europe, the Iranians and Russians are able to collect numerous tariffs and poll
charges while the Europeans can enjoy the goods of Southeast Asia more briskly
than before. To ensure efficient transportation, the Russians announced the
advancement of shipping facilities in the Astrakhan port while the Iranians have
done much to build up their avenues of transportation. Hence were the reasons
behind the establishment of the International North-South Transport Corridor or
INSTC in St. Petersburg, Russia by the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the secular Republic of India in the year 2000. Eager to capitalize on this
international business venture, the neighboring countries of the INSTC requested
membership into the organization. Fortunately for these other nations, the founding
members were eager to expand their plans to include not just Indian, Iranian,
European and Russian goods but also items from the Cuscus, Central Asia and the
Arabian Peninsula. The INSTC was expanded to include such states as Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Oman, Syria, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan, Ukraine as new active members and Bulgaria as an observing member.
At this current point in time, four of the five littoral states are members within the
INSTC. Only Turkmenistan has been left behind for reasons not well known.
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Considering the fact that a new railway is set to be built, which would link
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran together, one may rule out bad sentiment as a
reason for Turkmenistan's exclusion. It could be related to the limited amount of
hydrocarbon reserves Turkmenistan drills and exports. It would be uneconomical
to spend a great deal of money for transportation expenses only to break even at the
very end. Whatever the reasons for the Turkmen's absence, the INSTC members do
not seem to be too worried about who's involved but more eager to start shipping
their goods to eager European markets. But before the shipments of goods can be
sent to Western nations, the terms of transportation must be set. To their advantage,
the majority of the trade routes run through Iran and Russia. This empowers them
to set favorable conditions of trade with the other members. The Cuscus, Central
Asia and Eastern European members are not forced to deal with Iran in their trade
negotiations for the INSTC but Oman, Syria, Turkey and India are not in such
favorable grounds (see Appendix B). Ifit were not for a stubborn Armenia standing
in between Turkey and Azerbaijan, the Turkish government could have probably
worked out a favorable transportation deal with the Azeris. Unfortunately for the
Turks, the only outlet to the Caspian is through an economically tarnished Iran who
is more than willing to take large quantities of Turkish capital to fulfill
transportation services. Syria is stuck in the same boat as Turkey but at least their
regime is on better terms with Tehran. India and Oman not only have to pay for
shipping fees but in addition to this they are compelled to pay for physical
transportation fees in the form of tolls and handling expenses. Depending on what
roads are taken, there are up to seven different stops that must be made in Iran
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before goods can be sent from the southern most tip of the country to its most
northern portion. It is within Iran's sovereign right to charge poll fees for every
stop that is made in its territory. Hence, in addition to the handling expenses that
must be paid to Tehran for transporting foreign goods in its railways, a separate fee
for stops in major cities must also be forwarded to Iranians should the owners of the
goods wish for their possessions to reach the Caspian Sea. For instance, India has
no other choice but to ship its cargo from the distant port cities of Sori or Bandar
Anazli. The latter is located off of Iran's coast and thus constitutes seven and one
half stops. Although the Sori route does not encompass as many stops as the Anzali
route, it is subsequently farther from the Volga port. In essence, India would pay
the same amount of money to use either of the routes. Many political scientists
have discredited the importance of location in regards to international relations but
it seems as if Iran still provides the bridge between East and West (INSTC, pgs. 115).

Challenges to Cooperation
Traditionally, Iran has been the country that brings together Eastern and
Western forces in physical and political terms. In regards to the North-South
Corridor project and the Legal Status of the Caspian, Iran has done its best to be the
mediator in both situations. Unfortunately, the Russians have not taken warmly
toward Iran's mediation role and they have managed to use bilateral negotiations to
settle any sort of disputes they have had with other littoral states in terms of
ownership and usage rights to the Caspian Sea along with its resources. Taking into
account the sheer amount of influence and power Iran could potentially have on the
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predominately Muslim, newly independent soviet states, it would be foolish of
Russia to ensue its lone wolf activities in the Caspian. Though both countries
would be better off attempting to curb outside third party influences from the
region, it appears they are more concerned with their own activities. This sort of
conduct creates a hostile environment for business ventures as well as covering the
Caspian Region in a blanket of distrust. None of these are suitable for the growth
and development of the North-South Corridor, which delays profits for not only
Iran and Russia but every other nation-state involved in the activity as well.
However India's neutral stance toward both the Giants of the Caspian can help in
bringing them to a relatively balanced agreement over their differences. Yet such
an attempt of mediation could only work if Iran steps back from the role of
mediator in this instance for the sake of North-South Corridor. The question now
becomes whether or not Iran is willing or even capable of allowing a third party
foreign to the region to mediate in Caspian affairs? In order to accurately answer
this question one needs to examine the current chaotic political environment of Iran.
Since the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2006, the factional politics of Iran
became more intense than ever before with the reformists lead by former President
Rafsanjani watching every move of the hardliners waiting for them to make a
mistake so they could discredit the other side in the eyes of the judgmental Iranian
people. In a country where the majority of the significant government posts are
occupied by hardliners, this state of continuous competition leads to internal
bickering that slows the pace of work of the bureaucracies. Subsequently this
results in internal political chaos in Iran and delays in external projects. Giving
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power to a third party to mediate affairs in its neighborhood would result in great
criticism by the opposing reformists in Iran. Hence, the Iranian government can not
allow mediation to take place lead by India or any other nation-state for that matter.
For the sake of the North-South Transportation Corridor, hopefully Iran can quickly
resolve its issue with Russia. The hardliners definitely need a major victory for
their camp ever since the nuclear standoff with the West has died down. Their
unofficial motto was to defend the integrity of Iran and Iranian people but recently
there has not been a need to do so. To add insult to injury, the hardliners have
failed to resolve Iran's dire economic issues and gas reserves are running short in
one of the coldest winters in the country. Furthermore, the previous Khatami
reformist regime made great advancements in regional cooperation. A
transportation corridor between Uzbekistan and Iran running through Turkmenistan
was completed and talks were initiated for another route through Afghanistan. The
North-South Corridor would link up with these routes allowing the land locked
countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to transport and receive goods
to and from Europe. No comparable foreign policy feats have been accomplished
as of yet by the hardliners who are quickly losing the faith and support of the
impatient Iranian people (Kepbanov, pgs. 1-6).

Russia's Ambitions
Aside from the Islamic Republic of Iran, the other nation within the region
powerful enough to have a significant influence on the development of the NorthSouth Corridor or NSC is the Russian Federation. After all, the majority of the
transportation route is located in Russian territory. So it becomes increasingly
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important to analyze Russia's interests in and complications with this project. As a
tantalizing appetizer for the Russian government, the NSC offers hundred of
millions of dollars in taxes and customs revenues. Furthermore, Russia will gain
more political leverage in respect to Western European States. Should a situation
arise where Western Europe threatens Russian interests, the latter can threaten to
cripple the NSC and block the transport of South Asian goods to Europe. But
perhaps the greatest incentive to launch the NSC was the increase in Russian
prestige both domestically and abroad. With European transportation routes in
Central Asia that deliberately discriminated against Russia such as European
Union's TRACEA project, it has become very crucial that the Russians launch their
own transportation project that does not include the Western Europeans. Hanging
on the most eastern frontier of Europe, many European Nations treat Russia has the
red headed step child of their continent. Due to years of Communist rule by the
provocative former Soviet regime, the world tends to view Russia as an archaicbarbaric nation struggling to adapt to the modem era. For some time now, Russia
has been attempting to prove that it is civil and cultured as the rest of European
countries. Consequently, the NSC gives them such an opportunity by expanding
international trade in a quickly globalizing world. Being a President who founded
his political career on reestablishing Russia has a major power, Vladimir
Vladimirovich Putin jumped on the opportunity to launch the NSC project as a
founding member. Although on paper the NSC appears to be a feasible and coast
beneficial for the country, one can not help but to ponder on the possible negative
aspects of transportation routes. Not all Russian transportation terminals are in
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prime stone condition and hence delays may arise in the movement of cargo as a
result. To counter this decay, Russia has announced that it would develop some of
the major transportation terminals such as Oyla. However, is the Russian
government willing to invest in a considerable amount of capital should more
terminals need maintenance and or expansion? Would it be profitable to invest
money in improving transportation routes in Russia for the sake ofNSC? If the
Russian government intends on collecting tariffs, poll expenses and additional
transportation fees from the countries that intend on using the NSC, then the
answers to the questions stated above are obviously yes. Following this answer
comes yet another pertinent inquiry: Is Russia politically stable enough to be a vital
link in the NSC? With most of the major political opposition reduced to just
bickering from a safe distance, President Putin has managed to create a stable
environment conducive for the development of economic ventures. Although
Putin' s term is slowly drawing to its inevitable end, the country should be able to
maintain its stability after the current President' s term unless another raging
alcoholic decides to run for office and wins (Cantley, pgs. 447-480). Irrespective of
a handful of complications, the NSC is a lucrative transportation project that should
bring Russia extra revenue and some desperately needed international acclamation.

Turkic Brotherhood: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
The only other littoral states that have a vested interest in the NSTC are the
republics of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. None of these countries are founding
members and therefore can exert only a limited amount of influence on the other
member states. Never the less, these nations will benefit from the existence of the

45

NSTC. It is doubtful that any of them refused to contribute to the project financially
since it would lower their dependency on W estem architected and controlled
transportation routes in Central and Euro Asia. Taking into account its close
proximity to the Caspian Sea, one would assume Turkmenistan would have joined
as a founding State let alone as a secondary one. Yet the Turkmen government has
not requested to join the NSTC nor has it shown a particular interest in it. The
reason behind their abstinence is not easily explained due to the abundance of
benefits the NSTC could provide Turkmenistan. Possessing its own ports on the
coast of the Caspian, Turkmenistan wouldn't need to pay any fees to Iran to
transport its goods to Russia, which would save the country a great deal of money.
Essentially, the Turkmen can transport their products much faster and in a less
expensive fashion than the member states located south or west of Iran. Although
the country has not had a tradition of production and is currently not as active as its
neighbors, it still has certain items of interest such as iron that could be transported
to European markets via the NSTC (Mehdiyoum, pgs. 180-189). Only time will tell
if Turkmenistan decides to participate in the potentially lucrative NSTC business
venture.

Concluding Remarks
The NSTC's impact on the Caspian Legal Debate is uncertain, yet with the
employment of common sense and critical reasoning, one can come to a logical
conclusion to this matter. Russia and Iran will undoubtedly amass large monetary
wealth as well as strategic strength from the NSTC, which they may use to convert
into military power. Fortunately, the NSTC promotes free trade in the Caspian and
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that will do much in regards to curbing the militarization of that region. Though
nation-states rarely accumulate power then never intend to use it, and this may
result in these two Caspian Superpowers in using different avenues to influence the
other littoral states. Such methods may policy decisions along collective decision
makings of regional organizations. Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan may find themselves
in difficult economic situations if they choose to go against the will of either Russia
or Iran for they have the power to keep goods from flowing into and/or out of those
nations via the NSTC. Being two of the three founders of the NSTC, Iran and
Russia can enforce certain standards of trade the likes of which could include extra
tariffs and tolls or specialized conditions of trade. Perhaps this is the exact reason
why the Russian and Iranians were so animate about launching the NSTC and the
West a bit cautious toward it. On a brighter side, the level of international
cooperation needed to start and maintain the NSTC may push the littoral states into
more favorable grounds for negotiation in regards to the Caspian's Legal Status.
From a liberal perspective, cooperation on small issues will make cooperation
possible on the bigger imperative issues. On the other hand, a Realist would argue
that the profits gained from the NSTC may make Iran and Russia more selfish and
crude, which would make dealing with them nearly impossible (BBC, pgs. 1-3).
Which model will be upheld in real life is yet to be seen but as long as they are busy
profiteering then they do not have time for war.
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Chapter Five
Solutions to the Caspian Legal Ambiguity
Introduction
Explaining the numerous complexities existing within the elaborate
framework of the Caspian Legal Debate can alone be a comprehensive work on its
own. Yet it would be highly irresponsible for an author to leave out a section in
reference to a possible solution to a particular issue such as the one at the focal
point of this study. Hence this part of the work is solely in reference to the
solutions available to solving the international legal dispute. Certain facts and
disputes from other chapters will be summarized in this portion of the work to give
the reader( s) a better outlook on the Caspian Legal Dispute.

Basic Solution
The basic method of solving the problem would be to declare the Caspian an
international sea and give each littoral state share of the Caspian based on the
criteria explained in depth within Chapter three. However, the likelihood of this
actually materializing is highly unlikely as the nation-states that would benefit the
least have no incentive agree to this proclamation. For better or ill, the legalities of
the international sea are such that all parties with a direct state in a particular affair
must agree to sign on to the partition (Aras, pgs. 125-400). Unfortunately, the
provisions of the international sea do not allow for any flexibility. Common sense
dictates that all successful plans are those which undergo a considerable amount of
amending. A plan that forbids such a process of compromise is doomed to fail at its
very onset. With that stated, it is reasonable to assume that this initiative will never
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be accepted by all the littoral states and should thus be discarded as a reasonable
solution to the issue.

Only Other Choice Available
If the international sea is not suitable then the only option left to solve the

legal problem would be to proclaim the Caspian an international lake. On the other
hand, it does not set any suitable means for division, navigation or ownership rights
to the Caspian and its hydrocarbon resources. Reaching a compromise could be
difficult without a solid basis yet it is a definite possibility. The only truly
disturbing aspect of this plan would the fact that navigation through neighboring
lakes and rivers is highly discriminate. This means that any ship hoping to pass
through a lake must first get the permission of the nation-state that owns the body of
water. Those hoping to negotiate around this rule will be disappointed to realize it
is nonnegotiable. In this particular situation, Russia would benefit the most since its
famous Volga river runs straight through Asia to Europe and is a very effective
rough for trade with the West. If the littoral states agree to implement the
international sea plan they would have to abide by the rules of navigation set forth
by Russia. Then again, it would not differ from the current arrangement.
Currently, the lake model appears to the preferred choice of all littoral states. So if
the littoral states agree to declare the Caspian an international lake why has the
legal dispute not been solved? The answer is a simple one but it encompasses
numerous legalities warranting observation. Acceptable compromises to the three
main focal points of ownership, partition and navigation of the Caspian Sea have
not been reached. Individual states have articulated their own deals with one
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another yet failed to conclude a larger and more significant deal acceptable to all
parties involved. With each littoral state unwilling to bend at the negotiation table,
it doesn't seem likely that any acceptable solution will be reached in the foreseeable
future (Amirahmadi, pgs. 150-200). However there is still a spark of hope within
the seemingly lightless void of darkness. With the introduction of the NSTC the
littoral states have become a tad bit more tolerant of one another and their views on
this legal issue. Such a phenomena warrants the fundamental question of why? In
order to make the NSTC system work, the littoral states have no choice other than
to work more closely with one another despite any resentment they hold deep down
in their national psyches. The potential profit these countries can earn from the
North-South Trade Corridor are too precious too be turned due to some points of
confliction they have over a separate stalemated issue. Not surprisingly, the NSTC
system also indirectly sponsors the lake status for the Caspian by giving each
member the right to charge tolls, taxes and handling fees for shipments passing
through their territories. This level of sovereignty is exclusive to international lakes
and it's no wonder that two of the original members just so happen to also be the
ones that have much to gain should the Caspian be classified under this label. Even
with the subtle influences of Russia and Iran, the other littoral states with the
exception of Turkmenistan seem to be more interested in getting their goods to
Europe both faster and more efficiently.

TheINSTC
The International North South Trade Corridor seems to the essential element
within the formula for the resolution of the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea.
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Thus far it has helped expand cooperation between even the most ideological
different littoral states (INSTC, pgs. 1-2). Yet the INSTC has failed to address the
partition issue of the Caspian Sea. How the Caspian should be divided is still a
pestering question without a simple answer. It would be very difficult to convince
the littoral states to go beyond their own selfish interest and take into consideration
the well being of the region as a whole. The presence of interstate rivalries doesn't
make matters any easier as each littoral state has grounded itself in its position on
the partitioning of the Caspian. Meetings are held, mediators are selected amongst
the more ideological neutral littoral states to help ease tension between rival states
but none of these measures seem to produce any concretely positive results (INS TC,
pgs. 2-3 ). But then again holding even the most unproductive talks is better than
holding none at all. When countries fail to communicate in regards to their mutual
problems, the result is usually war. Armed conflict would do much to damage the
carefully crafted frame work of the INS TC and stall resolution developed over the
Caspian's legality issue. Furthermore, war in the Caspian region would prompt
other nations, especially Western European powers and the United States, to get
involved to protect their business and national interests. The aftermath of such a
war would be a site to gaze upon in aw and amazement but not in regards to its
beauty or majesty. Instead the world would look upon this region in astonishing
disgust that one of the most naturally beautiful parts of the world has turned into a
decadent wasteland. After logically concluding war as a major retarding factor one
is left with only one option for the solution of the legal battle of the official title of
the Caspian: expanding the INSTC to include political in addition to the economic
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cooperation. Slowly but surely the INS TC like NAFTA and to a far greater extent
the European Union should build on its economic collectivism to also include
political cohesiveness (Suleimanov, pg. 15). Eventually this will lead to resolution
of the Caspian conflict without reverting to barbaric and destructive means.
Perhaps the only draw back to this initiative is the fact that the length of time
between economic cooperation and economic unity is certain to be far apart. In
addition to this, one can only speculate how long it will be before the littoral states
can build political cohesion within the framework of the INSTC. Hence it is
imperative that the INTSC begin to promote political cooperation in other areas
independent of economic interests. Specific issues such as the protection of the
natural habitat of the Caspian region and the control of drug trafficking within
Caspian waters should serve as good starting points for furthering political
collaboration amongst the littoral states. Essentially what could be at works are the
dynamics that lead to the creation of the European Union or more commonly
referred to as the EU. France and Germany initiated the economic agreement that
would lead snowball into the EU some years ago after the devastation of World
War II. There is no reason to suspect that the INSTC is capable of delivering the
Caspian from the powerful grasp of dispute just as the European Coal and Steel
Community did for Europe (Suleimanov, pgs. 20-31 ).

Iran the Lion of the Caspian
An issue that has not be brought to the frontlines of the Caspian Legal battle

due to its ambiguous nature is the changing political atmosphere of Iran. Ever since
the controversial victory of conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the
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foreign and domestic policies have gone through a compete metamorphosis. Moves
to further privatization, non-hostile approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
along with cooperation with the United States have all been stalled for the
advancement of more aggressive policies. Even the Supreme Leader has always
been critical of the West and its initiatives, the Iranian Presidency has always been
dominated by liberal individuals that provided a sort of inferior check to the
conservatives on the top of the political pyramid. In 2006 this fact of Iranian
factional politics changed. Conservatives are currently in charge of both the
Supreme Leadership and Presidency within Iran. Consequently, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard is more active than ever in attempting to curb the United
States influence in the Middle East. Its head of affairs was replaced by a General
more sympathetic to the cause of Basij sect of the IRG. Socialist overtones are
being to bleed through the paper thin economic reforms initiated by the President
Ahmadinjad much to the dismay of the reformists. Western media outlets have
failed to portray the situation in an accurate light. President Ahmadinajed does not
represent the entire interest of the IRG but rather one specific sect known as the

Basij. In the Iraq-Iran war, the Basij sacrificed greatly to protect their country but
were poorly awarded after the war in comparison to the paramilitary troops of the
IRG. Obviously this tension caused major dissatisfaction among the Basij who
viewed the lack of recognition has a sign of inherent disrespect for the less
economically fortunate members oflranian society, which comprised the majority
of the members of the Basij. Hence the members of this IRG organ became more
socialistic in their political-economic philosophy. Currently, the economic reforms
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have been aimed at aiding the lower class and some instances punish the upper class
for possessing large amounts of capital. Some affluent members of the IRG have
also been targeted by the President's economic initiatives despite their privileged
positions within the Iranian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the bickering of the
reformists hasn't helped the Iranian President make any more friends but it has done
marvels in producing new enemies for him. Considering the relatively chaotic
situation of Iran's political atmosphere, it is amazing that the President has found
time to dedicate to the Caspian Legal Dispute. Mr. Ahmadinejad's approach to the
Caspian debate differs from that of his predecessor. Unlike former Iranian
President Muhammad Khatami, President Ahmadinejad isn't afraid of threatening
neighboring countries when necessary. Shortly after his election into office, the
Iranian President clearly told the President of Azerbaijan that if he considered
allowing the United States to open a military base in his country Iran would be
forced to preemptively react to such a hostile threat of eminent invasion.
Apparently the Azerbaijanis were not willing to call Ahmadinejad's bluff and
decided to deny President Bush the privilege of opening a US army base in their
country. This kind of openly aggressively behavior has its obviously uses for Iran.
Being one of the largest and strongest of the littoral states, Iran has finally decided
to use its muscle in bullying the smaller states in its region (Cohen , pgs. 1-9).
Although it is yet to be seen whether or not they would be willing to approach
another potentially dangerous issue the same way, one can be certain that no
resolution to the Caspian Legal debate that is not blatantly beneficial to Iran will be
accepted by the Ahmadinejad administration.
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Concluding Remarks
As the littorals states continue to resolve their legal issues over the Caspian
Sea, the rest of the world waits and hopes for the best. Of course the notion of what
is best differs from region to region as well as country to country. The United States
perverted obsession of granting Azerbaijan a great advantage in terms of water
territory and access to the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea has left
European nations pulling in the opposite direction. Backing Iran and Turkmenistan,
the W estem European nations feel that a too cozy of a relationship between the
Azeris and Americans would endanger their interest in the region. Former Soviet
states tend to discretely lean in the direction of the NSTC in hopes that the influence
of Russia will curbed by an international body. Such a tactic is a safe method of
opposing the sole domination of Russia while not appearing to be too sympathetic
to the other littoral states. At the comer of Southeast Asia, India has managed to
throw itself into the frying pan of international intrigue in the Caspian region by
helping to found the NSTC, which founded an Indian interest in the Caspian Legal
issue. Absent from the scene is the People's Republic of China; the only other
major power in the world that has failed to show particular interest in the Caspian
region. Considering there close economic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, one
could assume that if push comes to shove the Chinese will happily back their
economic partner in the region (Croissant, pgs. 225-300). Aside from the players in
this great new game are the paths to legal salvation. Although none of them are
adequate enough to resolve the numerous differences of opinion between the littoral
states, there are indeed a better alternative to having no options at all. The ultimate
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question boils down to which one of those options explained within this chapter is
best suited for the resolution of the Caspian Legal issue? A biased response would
appear similar to the author stating that the NSTC is the most efficient and effective
route to long journey toward legal resolution. It has the ability to unit all the littoral
states on common economic grounds while at the same time posses the ability to
expand into political cooperation in the near or distant future. Yet all the facts are
provided to the reader and therefore an independent assessment can be made
without accepting the author's outlook on the issue in its entirety.
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Conclusion
A Fina/Look
At this point within the study it is obvious to concur that the Caspian Legal
Debate entails not just the five littoral states but other powers foreign to the region
seeking to protect their own interests. In essence all the players in this great game
are merely attempting to accomplish one essential goal: to ensure the continued
survival of their national interests. Consequently this does not create the most
conducive environment for cooperation and the eventual conclusion of this legal
issue. Never the less the littoral states continue to carry out conventions that
ultimately seek to end the legal obscurity surrounding the Caspian Sea. However
these conventions always appear to be driven by the selfish needs of the more
powerful littoral states. If one were to simplify this issue, the Caspian Sea would be
divided between four interests. The first interest belonging to the Russian
Federation, the second to the Iranians, Kazakhstan comprises the third interest and
Azerbaijan would make up the last interest competing in the region. Turkmenistan
has been unable to break away from the other competing interests due to its lack of
effectively leadership. It has always been the case that the Turkmen have been
under the imposing umbrella of either the Russians or the under the protective
blanket of the Iranians. Azerbaijan's interest is driven by the Americans who
encourage, quite recklessly at times, the Azeris to challenge the Russians and
Iranians at any opportune time. Mean while Iran, Russia and Kazakhstan are all
looking out for themselves in a world filled with self-motivated rivals. Such a
hostile environment is likely to unite these three Caspian giants, which is why the
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increased cooperation between Iran and Russia is not seen as an unexpected
phenomenon. Taking into consideration the damaged image of the United States
and the lack of support for its activities in the Middle East by its European allies, it
isn't exactly a wise choice to comer three of the most powerful littoral states into a
position where unity would be the only logical answer to their common threat
(Jalali, pg. 7). Then again nothing is as it truly seems in politics and only the
cunning politicians truly know what's really going on behind the thick curtains of
diplomacy.

Reasonable Conclusions
At the end of the day, one ponders the age old question of how the Caspian
Sea issue relates to one's personal life as a civilian living thousands of miles away
from that region of the world? First and most pressing would the price of oil and
gas. Containing a rough estimate of oil comparable to that of the Persian Gulf, the
Caspian Sea has the potential to keep the twenty first century petroleum dependent
(Jalali,pg. 8). Depending on which country is in control of the major oil and gas
resources, the price of both of these commodities can go down or up depending on
how willing and able the provider is to place them on the global market. Secondly,
the Caspian Sea connects with a number of key rivers and lakes that are great routes
to ship cargo through, which also means that if any enemies of Western style
democracies ever got a hold of a weapon of mass destruction and sent it up stream
to Europe, it could create a very devastating catastrophe (Rand Research Group, pg.
21 ). Having a key ally in control of those transportation routes would be beneficial
to all European nations. Unfortunately for Europe, the majority of the lakes that

60

link to the Caspian and flow to Europe are in Russian territory (Jalali, pgs. 7-8). So
the nature of European-Russian relations is greatly impacted by the Caspian legal
debate. This also means that certain commodities from Asia might be more
expensive due to the tolls and other transportation fees that could be charged by the
Russians. If those two reasons aren't enough to convince an individual of the
importance of this study then perhaps the threat of an all out war will spark his or
her interest. Should a small armed conflict break out between two or three of the
littoral states, one can almost be certain that the major powers of the world are most
certain to get involved. An ordinary American citizen from Kansas might be called
to active duty to fight in a war to protect his country's interest within the Caspian
region from countries such as Iran and Russia. Hopefully it will never reach that
point but never the less the reader has most likely understood the fundamental
importance of this subject from the standpoint of an ordinary and academically
challenged individual. Having explored the various paths to Realist outcomes, it is
so evidently clear that the only logical answer to the legal issue of the Caspian is
developmental cooperation, which is the underlining neo-functionalist theme of this
study that advocates for the gradual establishment of a legal regime for the Caspian.
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Appendix B

The International North-South Transportation Corridor
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